History Podcasts

Gordon Clayton

Gordon Clayton

Gordon Clayton was born in Sunderland on 19th July 1910. A coalminer, he played football for Shotton Colliery before being signed by Major Frank Buckley, the manager of Wolverhampton Wanderers, in October 1932. He made his debut in 1933 and joined a team that included Dai Richards, Bryn Jones, Reg Hollingsworth, Billy Wrigglesworth, Tom Galley, Billy Hartill, Billy Barraclough, Stan Cullis, Tom Smalley and Charlie Phillips.

Clayton went through a barren period when he was unable to score. He got barracked by the Molineux crowd so badly that he considered giving up the game. Major Frank Buckley considered him a "grand centre-forward" and argued that it would be a "football tragedy" if this happened. Buckley's wife suggested that Clayton should have a "course of psychology" with a local doctor. This was a great success and Clayton went on to score 14 goals in the next 15 matches.

After finishing the course of treatment Clayton wrote to Dorothy Buckley: "I just learnt that it was you who was actually responsible for my treatment. I am very pleased with my success so far and I know you will be equally pleased. I cannot really thank you enough for what you have done... As you no doubt know the very name of Wolverhampton Wanderers was a nightmare to me. I detested the place. I do not think I was liked or respected by a single person with the exception of Major Buckley, who I have no doubt was always interested in my welfare, even though I must have exasperated him often."

Clayton scored 39 goals in 54 goals for Wolves before joining Aston Villa in October 1937. As Tony Matthews points out in the Who's Who of Aston Villa (2004): "Clayton was a tall, strapping footballer, recruited to bolster up Villa's attack during their Second Division championship-winning season." However, Clayton was not a success and only scored one goal in 11 games before being transferred to Burnley in October 1938. Clayton scored 10 goals in 16 games before the outbreak of the Second World War.


Gordon Clayton - History

The southern Palo Pinto County town of Gordon has a unique history. The town was strategically designated by the Texas and Pacific railroad in 1874 to bolster the use of their railroad, which was in its planning stages at the time. The town got its name from the man who initially surveyed the town site, civil engineer H.L. Gordon.

One cannot accurately tell the history of Gordon without first mentioning the towns of Hampton and Hoxie. The town of Hampton was located a little over a mile north of present day Gordon. Early written works put Hampton being settled around the year 1864. Hampton was a wood structured town that was on the frontier of Indian raids. A post office opened its doors in 1879 with Robert H. Rogan appointed as post master. Mr. Rogan and a Mr. Cotney were early town businessmen. Jess Neblet was the first merchant selling groceries and dry goods in town. On the religious front, the First Baptist Church of Hampton was organized 1879 with the Methodist Church following suit a few months later.

The community of Hoxie was located a couple of miles due east of Hampton at the foot of the Clayton Mountains. When Texas and Pacific surveyors came through the area in the 1870’s they discovered a good burning grade of coal at Hoxie. Within ten years the town of Hoxie was renamed Coalville and it became the primary source of coal for the Texas and Pacific railroad as it made it’s way through southern Palo Pinto County. This occurred between the years 1880 and 1881. The new railroad was part of largest single expansion of the Texas and Pacific system linking Fort Worth to Sierra Blanca.

As soon as the railroad made its way through Gordon a depot was constructed. Capt. John Ayers served as the first agent of the depot. The depot served as the center of activity in the town for many years

Coal from Coalville was shipped to Gordon for use on the railroad, which helped to bolster the early days of the settlement. Gordon began to grow rapidly and the townsfolk of Hampton realized that the best thing for their community was to merge into Gordon. Those early day town leaders included the likes of Albert Lusk, Ben Foster, Jess Neblet, Jim Moore, John Moore, Tod Wood, Alf Beckham, Jasper Odan, Jeff Cowden, Dock Abels, and Up Self.

By late 1881 Hampton was full swing in the process of relocation to the railroad town of Gordon. Records indicate that the First Baptist Church relocated to Gordon in late 1881 and the Methodist Church made the move in early 1882. The first independent school in Gordon opened its doors in 1882 with Mollie Shelton as the school’s first teacher. The Hampton post office was one of the last official relocations when it was moved to Gordon reopening there on Oct 17, 1883.


Gordon County was created on February 13, 1850 by an act of the Georgia General Assembly. [3] The new county was formed from portions of Cass (later renamed Bartow) and Floyd counties. All lands that would become Gordon County were originally occupied by the Cherokee Indians—and, in fact, the area was home of New Echota, the last seat of the Cherokee Nation. Even while Cherokees remained on their homeland, the General Assembly enacted legislation in December 1830 that provided for surveying the Cherokee Nation in Georgia and dividing it into sections, districts, and land lots. Subsequently, the legislature identified this entire area as "Cherokee County" (even though it never functioned as a county). An act of December 3, 1832 divided the Cherokee lands into ten new counties—Cass (later renamed Bartow), Cherokee, Cobb, Floyd, Forsyth, Gilmer, Lumpkin, Murray, Paulding, and Union. Cherokee lands were distributed to whites in a land lottery, but the legislature temporarily prohibited whites from taking possession of lots on which Cherokees still lived.

It was not until December 29, 1835 that Georgia had an official basis for claiming the unceded Cherokee lands that included the future location of Gordon County. In the Treaty of New Echota, a faction of the Cherokees agreed to give up all Cherokee claims to land in Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina and move west in return for $5 million. Though a majority of Cherokees opposed the treaty and refused to leave, the U.S. and Georgia considered it binding. In 1838, U.S. Army troops rounded up the last of 15,000 Cherokees in Georgia and forced them to march west in what came to be known as the "Trail of Tears", making this area the starting point of the removal.

Gordon County's original 1850 boundaries were changed numerous times between 1852 and 1877, during which time the legislature transferred portions of Cass (Bartow), Floyd, Murray, Pickens, and Walker counties to Gordon County, while transferring land from Gordon to Floyd and Murray counties.

Georgia's 94th county was named for William Washington Gordon [4] (1796–1842), the first Georgian to graduate from West Point and first president of the Central of Georgia Railroad.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the county has a total area of 358 square miles (930 km 2 ), of which 356 square miles (920 km 2 ) is land and 2.2 square miles (5.7 km 2 ) (0.6%) is water. [5]

Mountains in Gordon County include Baugh Mountain and Horn Mountain. [6] [7]

The eastern half of Gordon County is located in the Coosawattee River sub-basin of the ACT River Basin (Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin). Most of the western half of the county is located in the Oostanaula River sub-basin of the same larger ACT River Basin, while a small northerly portion of the county, between Resaca and Industrial City, is in the Conasauga River sub-basin of the ACT River Basin. [8]

Major highways Edit

Adjacent counties Edit

National protected area Edit

Historical population
Census Pop.
18505,984
186010,146 69.6%
18709,268 −8.7%
188011,171 20.5%
189012,758 14.2%
190014,119 10.7%
191015,861 12.3%
192017,736 11.8%
193016,846 −5.0%
194018,445 9.5%
195018,922 2.6%
196019,228 1.6%
197023,570 22.6%
198030,070 27.6%
199035,072 16.6%
200044,104 25.8%
201055,186 25.1%
2019 (est.)57,963 [9] 5.0%
U.S. Decennial Census [10]
1790-1960 [11] 1900-1990 [12]
1990-2000 [13] 2010-2013 [1]

2000 census Edit

As of the census [14] of 2000, there were 44,104 people, 16,173 households, and 12,259 families living in the county. The population density was 124 people per square mile (48/km 2 ). There were 17,145 housing units at an average density of 48 per square mile (19/km 2 ). The racial makeup of the county was 89.69% White, 3.46% Black or African American, 0.27% Native American, 0.53% Asian, 0.05% Pacific Islander, 4.98% from other races, and 1.01% from two or more races. 7.41% of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race.

There were 16,173 households, out of which 35.80% had children under the age of 18 living with them, 60.40% were married couples living together, 11.10% had a female householder with no husband present, and 24.20% were non-families. 20.30% of all households were made up of individuals, and 8.10% had someone living alone who was 65 years of age or older. The average household size was 2.70 and the average family size was 3.08.

In the county, the population was spread out, with 26.10% under the age of 18, 9.50% from 18 to 24, 31.40% from 25 to 44, 22.50% from 45 to 64, and 10.60% who were 65 years of age or older. The median age was 34 years. For every 100 females there were 99.00 males. For every 100 females age 18 and over, there were 97.10 males.

The median income for a household in the county was $38,831, and the median income for a family was $43,184. Males had a median income of $29,761 versus $22,256 for females. The per capita income for the county was $17,586. About 7.50% of families and 9.90% of the population were below the poverty line, including 12.10% of those under age 18 and 14.30% of those age 65 or over.

2010 census Edit

As of the 2010 United States Census, there were 55,186 people, 19,715 households, and 14,653 families living in the county. [15] The population density was 155.1 inhabitants per square mile (59.9/km 2 ). There were 22,278 housing units at an average density of 62.6 per square mile (24.2/km 2 ). [16] The racial makeup of the county was 85.2% white, 3.6% black or African American, 1.0% Asian, 0.4% American Indian, 0.1% Pacific islander, 7.7% from other races, and 2.0% from two or more races. Those of Hispanic or Latino origin made up 14.0% of the population. [15] In terms of ancestry, 14.6% were American, 9.8% were Irish, 6.9% were English, and 6.7% were German. [17]

Of the 19,715 households, 39.3% had children under the age of 18 living with them, 55.8% were married couples living together, 12.9% had a female householder with no husband present, 25.7% were non-families, and 21.6% of all households were made up of individuals. The average household size was 2.77 and the average family size was 3.20. The median age was 36.0 years. [15]

The median income for a household in the county was $40,916 and the median income for a family was $47,964. Males had a median income of $37,358 versus $28,394 for females. The per capita income for the county was $18,285. About 13.7% of families and 17.1% of the population were below the poverty line, including 22.7% of those under age 18 and 17.1% of those age 65 or over. [18]

In addition to service industries, the economy of Gordon County is rooted in manufacturing and both heavy and light industry. Mohawk Industries, a leading manufacturer of flooring, is headquartered in Gordon County. In addition, Shaw Industries, Beaulieu International Group, LG Chem, and Kobelco Construction Machinery America - a division of Kobe Steel - have significant presences in Gordon, County.

Gordon County was the home of the Georgia Yellow Hammers, an old-time music group from the 1920s. The Yellow Hammers, chiefly composed of Bill Chitwood, Clyde Evans, Bud Landress, Charles Ernest Moody, and Phil Reeve were one of the most important bands during the heyday of old-time music. They have left their mark on the community. The Calhoun High School (Calhoun, Georgia) Yellow Jackets football team play in Phil Reeve Stadium. Mr. Moody was the author of songs which are today Southern Gospel standards including "Drifting Too Far From the Shore" which has been covered and recorded by such artists as Jerry Garcia, Emmylou Harris, Phil Lesh, Hank Williams and many others.

Two fatal rail accidents took place in Gordon County in the late 20th century. The first one was in 1981 when Southern Railway train #160 collided with a log truck near the community of Oostanaula. The engineer and the driver of the log truck were fatally injured. In 1990, Train #188 ran a stop signal at the north end of the siding at Davis, Georgia and collided with Train #G38 on the same line. The engineer and conductor on #G38 and the conductor on #188 died in this collision. A monument stands at the site of the collision near the Georgia Highway 136 crossing.

Bert Lance, an advisor to Jimmy Carter's successful presidential campaign, served as Chairman of the Board of Calhoun First National Bank, later acquired by Truist Financial. As of 2020, Carter is the final Democratic nominee to win Gordon County (1980).


Player Value--Batting

View Complete Notes on Fielding Data

  • Pre-1916 SB & CS data for catchers is estimated from catcher assists, games started and opposition stolen bases.
  • From 1916 on SB, CS, Pickoff, & WP data for catchers and pitchers is taken from play-by-play accounts in the retrosheet files. There are several hundred games without pbp from 1916 to 1972 and for those we may not have any data.
  • CG & GS come from the retrosheet data and should be complete and pretty accurate from 1901 on.
  • Innings played (like SB and CS) come from the retrosheet play-by-play data and should be considered mostly complete from 1916 to 1972 and complete from then on.
  • Stats (PO,A,G, etc) for LF-CF-RF positions (since 1901) is taken from play-by-play or box score data as available.
  • Stats (PO,A,G,etc) for C,P,1B,2B,3B,SS,OF positions is taken from the official reported totals and may have been corrected at various times since their publication.
  • For detailed information on which games retrosheet is missing play-by-play from 1916 to 1972, please see their most wanted games list
  • For detailed information on the availability of data on this site by year, see our data coverage page

Carl Brooks

Carl Brooks was a civil rights activist, labor leader, and member of the Communist Party (CP) in the state of Washington. Born in 1908 and raised in Seattle, in 1934 Brooks replaced Revels Cayton as president of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights and during his brief tenure led a number of direct-action protests against segregated businesses in Seattle. In the mid to late 1930s, Brooks, along with several other local Communists, became active in the Washington Commonwealth Federation (WCF), a collection of labor unions and political reformists that quickly emerged as a influential left-wing caucus of the state Democratic Party. In November of 1936, Brooks campaigned on the WCF platform for the state legislature. The following year he represented the WCF in Philadelphia at the second National Negro Congress, a Popular Front effort to unite the various civil rights organizations operating at the time under a single banner. More.

As the leading African American in the Washington Commonwealth Federation, Brooks also spearheaded the WCF's involvement in a number of local civil rights struggles throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, including efforts to block an anti-interracial marriage bill introduced in 1937, protests against two high-profile police brutality cases involving African American victims in 1938 and 1943, and the WCF's successful campaign to integrate West Seattle's Colman public swimming pool in 1941. As a politically active African American and a member of the Communist Party, Brooks faced a doubled risk of violence and repression. In 1943 his home was firebombed in an effort to enforce a restrictive housing covenant and pressure his family out of its predominantly white neighborhood. In 1947, Brooks became a target of the state legislature's investigative committee on un-American activities, known as the Canwell Committee after its founder and chairman, State Representative Albert Canwell. Although he was never called to testify, Brooks created a stir when he interrupted the testimony of former African American Communist George Hewitt to denounce the proceedings, after which he was forcibly removed from the building. Brooks remained active in union politics through the 1950s, serving as President of the militant Shipscalers Union, and in electoral politics, campaigning for Seattle City Council on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948. However, perhaps because of the anticommunist backlash, scant evidence survives of Brooks' later years and it is unclear when he died or whether he stayed in Seattle after the mid 1950s. –Daren Salter


Trevor Gordon Hall

The unfolding era of the music business has provided many fresh opportunities for artists to foster direct and meaningful connections with new audiences around the globe. Trevor Gordon Hall is a powerful emerging voice, albeit without words to his music, showing that combining honest heart felt compositions with precise technical virtuosity do not sideline an artist in today’s world but can launch a wider reach than ever before. With an exploding presence on streaming services like Spotify, YouTube etc, a tour calendar that has taken him all over the world, it’s safe to say that this is a new era for artists like Trevor to engage listeners from all cultures, languages, genres, and backgrounds.

Rated one of the top 30 guitarists in the world under 30 years of age by Acoustic Guitar magazine, Trevor is an instrumentalist from Philadelphia USA whose style ranges from edgy driving rhythms to delicate melodic themes. Exploring the guitar’s full creative potential, his blending of sounds weave together textures into grand yet intimate and lyrical compositions. While leaving no physical aspect of the guitar untouched, Trevor navigates audiences through an igniting experience of music that isn’t just heard but felt. Aside from being featured on NPR, NBC, PBS and countless international media outlets, Trevor’s tour calendar has taken him to 14 countries and counting performing at many historic places including Carnegie Hall in NYC, Union Chapel in London, Music History Museum in Bologna, Adolfo Mejia Theater in Colombia, and more. He has also had the opportunity to share the stage with some of the most trusted and legendary names in the music business prompting high praise from John Mayer, Steve Miller, Graham Nash, Steve Hackett, Dar Williams, Will Ackerman, Pat Martino, Stanley Jordan, Phil Keaggy, Tommy Emmanuel, Andy McKee and more.

At the start of his career, Trevor caught the eye of 9 time Grammy award winning producer Joe Nicolo (James Taylor, Billy Joel, Bob Dylan, etc.), who produced two of Trevor’s releases, Finding My Way and Let Your Heart Be Light, in 2008 and 2009. Then in 2010, inspired by his studies and always on the hunt for new sounds to utilize, Trevor collaborated with various builders to design an instrument combining an African finger piano (kalimba) and an acoustic guitar. The instrument combination, which Trevor calls the “Kalimbatar”, has opened up new possibilities for solo instrumental music. Compositions inspired by the pairing of the two instruments were first introduced in previous releases but fully realized in Trevor’s Candyrat Records debut Entelechy. Upon its release in 2011, this album rapidly climbed the iTunes Singer/Songwriter charts, as well as YouTube Top Commented/Top Favorited/Most Discussed categories gathering millions of views with the release of performance videos.

In the next few years leading up to his 2014 album Mind Heart Fingers, Trevor redesigned and fine-tuned the Kalimbatar with the help of master luthier Sheldon Schwartz. Trevor recorded with his new instrument at Imaginary Road Studios in VT with Grammy winning and long time hero Will Ackerman (Founder of Windham Hill Records.) Mind Heart Fingers was the result of a unique experience created between Will, Tom Eaton and Trevor, to capture a heart-felt recording honoring the guitar tradition which Windham Hill helped to launch, while looking forward to what is next for the guitar scene. This project reached #4 on the ZMR international radio charts and was nominated for best instrumental acoustic album of the year by the ZMR awards.

Constantly working on new sounds and possibilities, Trevor released the first of an EP series entitled Kalimbatar Classics Vol. 1 in 2015 featuring his arrangements of classical piano standards for the Kalimbtar. Moving from that into the electronic world in his 2016 release Late Night with Headphones Vol. 1, Trevor introduced his listeners to new sounds incorporating electric guitar and electronic textures.

Trevor is an artist on a mission to ride the line between being adventurous and accessible. As Grammy winning Will Ackerman has said “…Trevor has a stunning range stylistically while being made cohesive by the power of Trevor’s artistic voice and vision. a guitarist we will need to pay attention to…”, and guitarist Don Ross agrees, “…Trevor has a timeless sense of melody, and he creates some of the richest sonic textures you're likely to hear from any contemporary composer/guitarist…”


Player Value--Pitching

View Complete Notes on Fielding Data

  • Pre-1916 SB & CS data for catchers is estimated from catcher assists, games started and opposition stolen bases.
  • From 1916 on SB, CS, Pickoff, & WP data for catchers and pitchers is taken from play-by-play accounts in the retrosheet files. There are several hundred games without pbp from 1916 to 1972 and for those we may not have any data.
  • CG & GS come from the retrosheet data and should be complete and pretty accurate from 1901 on.
  • Innings played (like SB and CS) come from the retrosheet play-by-play data and should be considered mostly complete from 1916 to 1972 and complete from then on.
  • Stats (PO,A,G, etc) for LF-CF-RF positions (since 1901) is taken from play-by-play or box score data as available.
  • Stats (PO,A,G,etc) for C,P,1B,2B,3B,SS,OF positions is taken from the official reported totals and may have been corrected at various times since their publication.
  • For detailed information on which games retrosheet is missing play-by-play from 1916 to 1972, please see their most wanted games list
  • For detailed information on the availability of data on this site by year, see our data coverage page

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon 2019 NY Slip Op 02306 Decided on March 27, 2019 Appellate Division, Second Department Miller, J., J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 27, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
ROBERT J. MILLER
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
2015-10709
(Index No. 15788/12)

[*1]Bank of New York Mellon, etc., respondent,

Dushaun Gordon, appellant, et al., defendants.

APPEAL by the defendant Dushaun Gordon, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, from an order of the Supreme Court (Thomas A. Adams, J.), entered in Nassau County on August 7, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon a decision of the same court dated July 23, 2015, (1) granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant and dismissing the affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due, and (2), in effect, denied that defendant's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him or, in the alternative, to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124, and for leave to enter a default judgment on his cross claims asserted against the defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

David J. Broderick, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Kenneth R. Berman of counsel), for appellant.

Frankel Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon LLP, Bayshore, NY (Christopher P. Kohn of counsel), for respondent.

In the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the trial courts of this state have faced an unprecedented spike in judicial foreclosure actions. The challenges presented by this dramatic increase in litigation have been compounded by poor record-keeping practices, a changing regulatory environment, inordinate delays, and inadequate legal representation. The sheer number of foreclosure cases has also resulted in a renewed focus on the legal principles underlying such actions and presented circumstances under which those principles must be extended and applied to new factual scenarios.

From an appellate perspective, the recent flood of foreclosure appeals has revealed consistent and repeated confusion about some of the most fundamental aspects of the procedural, substantive, and evidentiary law that must be routinely applied in a foreclosure context. In an effort to provide additional clarity in this important area of the law, we deem it appropriate to collect and reiterate some of these foundational principles in the hope that such clarity will eliminate many of the disputes that make up an ever-increasing proportion of trial-level dockets. For the reasons that follow, we modify the order appealed from.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant Dushaun Gordon interposed an answer which included 55 affirmative defenses, 5 counterclaims asserted against the plaintiff, and 2 cross claims asserted against the defendant Mortgage Electronic [*2]Registration Systems, Inc. (hereinafter MERS).

The plaintiff thereafter moved for, among other relief, summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Gordon and dismissing the affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due. Gordon opposed the plaintiff's motion and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him or, in the alternative, to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124, and for leave to enter a default judgment on his cross claims asserted against MERS.

In a decision dated July 23, 2015, the Supreme Court determined, among other things, that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the complaint. A subsequent order entered August 7, 2015, upon the decision, inter alia, (1) granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Gordon and dismissing the affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due, and (2), in effect, denied Gordon's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him or, in the alternative, to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124, and for leave to enter a default judgment on his cross claims asserted against MERS. Gordon appeals from those portions of the order entered August 7, 2015. We modify.

A motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party" (CPLR 3212[b] see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324). Such a motion must be supported "by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions" (CPLR 3212[b]). To make a prima facie showing, the moving party must "demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment by submission of proof in admissible form" (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 507 see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Admissible evidence may include "affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts [and] reciting the material facts" (GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 see CPLR 3212[b] Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 508). "Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action'" (Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 50, quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324).

"In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party" (Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 22 see Pearson v Dix McBride, LLC, 63 AD3d 895). "The function of the court on a motion for summary judgment is not to resolve issues of fact or determine matters of credibility, but merely to determine whether such issues exist" (Kolivas v Kirchoff, 14 AD3d 493, 493 see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d at 23). Accordingly, "[t]he court may not weigh the credibility of the affiants on a motion for summary judgment unless it clearly appears that the issues are not genuine, but feigned" (Glick & Dolleck v Tri-Pac Export Corp., 22 NY2d 439, 441 see 6243 Jericho Realty Corp. v AutoZone, Inc., 27 AD3d 447, 449). "[W]here credibility determinations are required, summary judgment must be denied" (People v Greenberg, 95 AD3d 474, 483, affd 21 NY3d 439 see Pryor & Mandelup, LLP v Sabbeth, 82 AD3d 731, 732 Campbell v Campbell, 43 AD3d 1264, 1266).

In addition, " [a] motion for summary judgment will not be granted if it depends on proof that would be inadmissible at the trial under some exclusionary rule of evidence'" (Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d at 52, quoting David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:18 at 27 [2005 ed] see HSBC Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Royal, 142 AD3d 952, 954 Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Mercius, 138 AD3d 650, 652 US Bank N.A. v Madero, 125 AD3d 757, 758). "Out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matters they assert are hearsay and may be received in evidence only if they fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and then only if the proponent demonstrates that the evidence is reliable" (Nucci v Proper, 95 NY2d 597, 602 [internal quotation marks omitted] see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 508).

In this case, Gordon contends that the Supreme Court should not have awarded the plaintiff summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against him because, in his view, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff has standing to maintain this action. This

contention is without merit.

"[W]here, as here, standing is not an essential element of the cause of action, under CPLR 3018(b) a defendant must affirmatively plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense in the answer in order to properly raise the issue in its responsive pleading" (US Bank N.A. v Nelson, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2019 NY Slip Op 00494, *2-3 [2d Dept 2019] see Matter of Fossella v Dinkins, 66 NY2d 162, 167 BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v Alvarado, 168 AD3d 1029, 1030 see also Green Bus Lines v Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74 AD2d 136, 142-143). Here, Gordon asserted standing as an affirmative defense in his answer. Accordingly, the issue of standing is properly before this Court (cf. US Bank N.A. v Nelson, ___ AD3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op 00494).

Where the issue of standing is raised by a defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff must prove its standing in order to be entitled to relief against that defendant (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roumiantseva, 130 AD3d 983, 983-984 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Calderon, 115 AD3d 708, 709 Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 279). "A plaintiff establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by demonstrating that it is either the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Gallagher, 137 AD3d 898, 899 see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d 355, 360-362). "Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident" (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754 see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Weinberger, 142 AD3d 643, 644-645).

Here, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that it had standing to prosecute this action by demonstrating that it was in physical possession of the note, which had been endorsed in blank, at the time the action was commenced. In this regard, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of its attorneys' employee, Kyra Schwartz, who stated that certain business records, which were maintained by her employer and attached to her affidavit, demonstrated that the plaintiff's attorneys were in possession of the original note endorsed in blank since August 19, 2011, a date which was prior to the commencement of this action (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Tobing, 163 AD3d 518, 519-520 U.S. Bank, N.A. v Cardenas, 160 AD3d 784, 785 PennyMac Corp. v Chavez, 144 AD3d 1006, 1007 M & T Bank v Cliffside Prop. Mgt., LLC, 137 AD3d 876, 877).

In opposition, Gordon failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the issue of standing. Inasmuch as the mortgage "passes with the debt as an inseparable incident" (U.S. Bank,

N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754 see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d at 361), Gordon's arguments regarding the validity and timing of the mortgage assignment failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Heiney, 168 AD3d 1126, 1127 Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Vrionedes, 167 AD3d 829, 830 Flagstar Bank, FSB v Mendoza, 139 AD3d 898, 900).

Gordon further contends that Schwartz's affidavit was insufficient to lay a proper foundation for the admissibility of the business records that she attached to it. This contention is also without merit.

"Records made in the regular course of business are hearsay when offered for the truth of their contents" (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-301 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]). "The statutory business records rule, now CPLR 4518(a), was originally enacted in 1928 to overcome the [*3]deficiencies of common law rules which severely hampered proof of many valid claims" (id. see People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569, 578 Johnson v Lutz, 253 NY 124, 127-128).

The current version of the business records rule provides that

"[a]ny writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business and that it was the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter" (CPLR 4518[a]).

An "electronic record . . . shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record" (id.). A court "may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record" (id.). However, "[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the maker, may be proved to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility" (id. see People v Kangas, 28 NY3d 984, 985-986 cf. Fed Rules Evid rule 803[6]).

Accordingly, to establish a foundation for the admission of a business record, the proponent of the record must satisfy the requirements identified in the statute (see CPLR 4518[a]). First, the proponent must establish "that the record be made in the regular course of business—essentially, that it reflect a routine, regularly conducted business activity, and that it be needed and relied on in the performance of functions of the business" (People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d at 579). Second, the proponent must also demonstrate "that it be the regular course of such business to make the record . . . essentially, that the record be made pursuant to established procedures for the routine, habitual, systematic making of such a record" (id. at 579-580). Third, the proponent must establish "that the record be made at or about the time of the event being recorded—essentially, that recollection be fairly accurate and the habit or routine of making the entries assured" (id. at 580).

In addition to these statutory requirements, the Court of Appeals has held that "[u]nless some other hearsay exception is available, admission may only be granted where it is demonstrated that the informant has personal knowledge of the act, event or condition and he [or she] is under a business duty to report it to the entrant" (Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 123 [citation omitted] see People v Patterson, 28 NY3d 544, 550 Johnson v Lutz, 253 NY at 127-128 Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337, 346). That said, "[i]t would clearly defeat the utility of CPLR 4518 to require the testimony of all persons involved in creating the record" (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-306 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]).

Finally, under the circumstances here, it bears noting that the business record exception to the hearsay rule applies to a "writing or record" (CPLR 4518[a]). Although "[t]he foundation for admission of a business record usually is provided by the testimony of the custodian, the author or some other witness familiar with the practices and procedures of the particular business" (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-306 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]), it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted (see generally Great Am. Ins. Co. v Auto Mkt. of Jamaica, N.Y., 133 AD3d 631, 632-633 35 Carmody-Wait 2d § 194:94 [2019] cf. 9 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac CPLR ¶ 4518.20). Accordingly, "[e]vidence of the contents of business records is admissible only where the records themselves are introduced" (35 Carmody-Wait 2d § 194:94 [2019] see People v Barnes, 177 AD2d 989 see also People v Olivero, 27 Misc 3d 1218[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50794[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County] People v Ross, 12 Misc 3d 755, 764 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2006]). "Without their introduction, a witness's testimony as to the contents of the records is inadmissible hearsay" (35 Carmody-Wait 2d § 194:94 [2019] see U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v 22 S. Madison, LLC, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2019 NY Slip Op 01635, *2 [2d Dept 2019] People v Barnes, 177 AD2d 989). Of course, generally speaking, a witness may always testify as to matters which are within his or her personal knowledge through personal observation (see Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence §§ 4-301, 6-210 [Farrell 11th ed 1995] see also People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990, 992 Pease v Smith, 61 NY 477, 484-485 People v Duffy, 124 AD2d 258, 260 Levy v Huwer, 80 App Div 499, 501-502, affd 176 NY 612).

Here, Schwartz stated in her affidavit that she was employed by the law firm that represented the plaintiff in this action. Schwartz stated that she was "employed as the manager of a group of employees . . . that is responsible for receiving original loan documents from the firm's clients [and] documenting the receipt of [those] original loan documents." She stated that, when a client forwards a file containing original loan documents, "[her] staff makes a computer entry . . . confirming [their] receipt." These entries were made "at or about the time of the receipt of the original loan documents," and the records of such events were "created and maintained in the ordinary course of [the] business" of the plaintiff's attorneys. Finally, Schwartz stated that "[i]t was the normal course of [the firm's] business to store these records as computer entries."

Schwartz further stated that she reviewed the firm's business records relative to this case, which records showed that the original note was received on August 19, 2011. Attached to Schwartz's affidavit was "a true and accurate printout [she] made of the computer entry confirming the receipt . . . of the original note." Schwartz also attached a copy of the original note to her affidavit, and affirmed that she had compared this copy "to the original note which remains in storage under the custody of [her] team" and that the copy was "a true and accurate copy of the original note."

Contrary to Gordon's contention, Schwartz did not need to demonstrate her familiarity with the record-keeping practices and procedures of the plaintiff, the original lender, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (hereinafter Countrywide), or MERS, in order to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the business record attached to her affidavit. Schwartz sought to lay a foundation for the admission of a business record maintained by her employer, the plaintiff's attorneys. She did not seek to lay a foundation for business records produced or maintained by any of the other entities identified by Gordon. As this Court has previously observed, "[t]here is no requirement that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action rely on any particular set of business records to establish a prima facie case, so long as the plaintiff satisfies the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a), and the records themselves actually evince the facts for which they are relied upon" (Citigroup v Kopelowitz, 147 AD3d 1014, 1015 see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Ozcan, 154 AD3d 822, 826). Accordingly, under the circumstances, since Schwartz only sought to lay a foundation for a business record produced and maintained by her own employer, she was only required to set forth her familiarity with her employer's record-keeping practices and procedures (see generally CPLR 4518[a] People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d at 579-580 cf. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Baritz, 144 AD3d 618 US Bank N.A. v Handler, 140 AD3d 948 Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Mercius, 138 AD3d 650).

Gordon's remaining arguments relating to the issue of standing are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal or without merit. Accordingly, since Gordon failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the issue of standing in opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses that raised the issue of standing, to wit, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 14th, 15th, 26th, 27th, and 36th affirmative defenses (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Vrionedes, 167 AD3d at 830 cf. US Bank N.A. v Weinman, 123 AD3d 1108, 1109-1110).

Although vague and inartfully drafted, Gordon's brief, liberally construed, in effect, contends that the Supreme Court should not have awarded the plaintiff summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against him and dismissing the 20th affirmative defense because, in his view, the plaintiff failed to sustain its initial burden of demonstrating that he defaulted in the repayment of the subject note. This contention has merit.

To establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff must produce the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Vrionedes, 167 AD3d at 830 Giller v Weiss, 140 AD3d 1117, 1118 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Spitzer, 131 AD3d 1206, 1206-1207). A plaintiff may establish a payment default by an admission made in response to a notice to admit (see CPLR 3212[b] 3123), by an affidavit from "a person having [personal] knowledge of the facts" (CPLR 3212[b]), or by other evidence "in admissible form" (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 507). Here, as Gordon correctly contends, the plaintiff's submissions failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the business records relied upon by the plaintiff to establish Gordon's default in the repayment of the subject loan.

The plaintiff relied upon the affidavit of Rosalind Carroll to lay a foundation for the [*4]admission of business records purporting to show that Gordon had defaulted under the terms of the subject note by failing to make required monthly payments. Carroll stated that she was a "document coordinator" for an entity named "Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" (hereinafter Bayview), which was identified by Carroll as a "servicer for the plaintiff." Carroll went on to state: "According to the business records I have reviewed, [Gordon] defaulted on the loan by failing to make monthly payments due on May 1, 2008 and continuing to the present."

Although Carroll adequately described the record-keeping practices and procedures utilized by Bayview, and adequately stated her familiarity with those practices, she did not actually attach or otherwise incorporate any of Bayview's business records to her affidavit. Accordingly, to the extent that Carroll's purported knowledge of Gordon's default was based upon her review of unidentified business records created and maintained by Bayview, her affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value (see Flick Lbr. Co. v Breton Indus., 223 AD2d 779, 780 People v Barnes, 177 AD2d 989 Dempsey v Intercontinental Hotel Corp., 126 AD2d 477, 479 see also 35 Carmody-Wait 2d § 194:94 [2019]).

The only purported business record specifically identified by Carroll as demonstrating Gordon's default is a document dated June 16, 2008. The record indicates that this document was annexed to Carroll's affidavit. However, Carroll does not specifically allege that Bayview created the document. Furthermore, the document, on its face, indicates that it was created by Countrywide, the original lender, and Carroll does not allege that she is personally familiar with that entity's record-keeping practices and procedures. As previously noted, "[a] proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures" (Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d 861, 861 [emphasis added]).

Of course, Carroll's status as an employee of Bayview does not necessarily mean that she is incompetent to lay a foundation for the admission of business records that were created by another entity (see People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d 81, 90). It is true that as a general rule, "the mere filing of papers received from other entities, even if they are retained in the regular course of business, is insufficient to qualify the documents as business records" (Standard Textile Co. v National Equip. Rental, 80 AD2d 911, 911 see People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d at 90). However, such records may be admitted into evidence if the recipient can establish personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures, or establish that the records provided by the maker were incorporated into the recipient's own records and routinely relied upon by the recipient in its own business (see People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d at 90-91 Bank of Am., N.A. v Brannon, 156 AD3d 1, 8 State of New York v 158th St. & Riverside Dr. Hous. Co., Inc., 100 AD3d 1293, 1296 People v DiSalvo, 284 AD2d 547, 548-549 Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v Leucadia, Inc., 117 AD2d 727, 728 cf. United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786, 800 [2d Cir] Matter of Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 665 F2d 43, 46 [2d Cir]). Indeed, "[t]he reports of an independent contractor regularly relied on by the business may qualify as the business' record" (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-307 [Farrell 11th ed 1995] cf. General Ins. Co. of Am. v United States Fire Ins. Co., 886 F3d 346, 358 [4th Cir] Cocroft v HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 796 F3d 680 [7th Cir]).

Here, however, Carroll failed to attest to her personal knowledge of Countrywide's record-keeping practices, and failed to allege that the document that she attached to her affidavit was incorporated into Bayview's records and routinely relied upon by Bayview in its business. Accordingly, under the circumstances, Carroll's affidavit was insufficient to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the document dated June 16, 2008 (see e.g. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Baritz, 144 AD3d at 619-620 HSBC Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Royal, 142 AD3d at 954 Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Mercius, 138 AD3d at 652 Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d at 861-862).

Moreover, as Gordon correctly contends, certain factual assertions made by Carroll in her affidavit which are relevant to the issue of Gordon's default are directly contradicted by the documents that she attached to her affidavit. Other factual assertions made by Carroll in her affidavit are contradicted by other portions of her own affidavit. These contradictions raise issues of credibility (see e.g. Taieb v Hilton Hotels Corp., 131 AD2d 257, 261), and, as such, Carroll's affidavit failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with respect to the issue of Gordon's default (see Cristescu v Gasparis, 148 AD3d 669 see generally Pryor & Mandelup, LLP v Sabbeth, 82 AD3d at 732).

We note that the plaintiff did actually submit payment records relating to Gordon's mortgage in support of its motion. However, these payment records were not attached to, or [*5]otherwise incorporated into, Carroll's affidavit, and she did not identify these records or make specific reference to them. Rather, the plaintiff inexplicably attached these payment records as an exhibit to its attorney's affirmation. The plaintiff's attorney does not allege personal knowledge of the record-keeping practices and procedures of the entity that created these payment records (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 563). Since the plaintiff failed to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the payment records into evidence, those records do not constitute admissible evidence and cannot serve to establish, prima facie, Gordon's default in the repayment of the subject loan (see generally Mallen v Farmingdale Lanes, LLC, 89 AD3d 996, 997 Roldan v New York Univ., 81 AD3d 625, 627 Toussaint v Ferrara Bros. Cement Mixer, 33 AD3d 991, 992 Daliendo v Johnson, 147 AD2d 312, 321).

In sum, since the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, Gordon's default in the repayment of the subject loan through the submission of evidence in admissible form, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Gordon and dismissing the 20th affirmative defense asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due (see Fulton Holding Group, LLC v Lindoff, 165 AD3d 1045, 1047-1048 HSBC Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Royal, 142 AD3d at 954).

D. Gordon's Remaining Contentions

Addressing the remaining affirmative defenses asserted in his answer, Gordon contends that they should not have been dismissed by the Supreme Court, sua sponte. Contrary to Gordon's contention, the court did not "sua sponte" strike Gordon's answer and counterclaims. Rather, this relief was specifically requested in the plaintiff's motion papers.

Further, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny those branches of Gordon's cross motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him, as he failed to demonstrate his entitlement to such relief. Gordon argues that the plaintiff's general denials of the allegations underlying his counterclaims constituted judicial admissions that prove fatal to the plaintiff's complaint. Formal judicial admissions include facts that are "admitted" by a party's pleadings (Zegarowicz v Ripatti, 77 AD3d 650, 653). To constitute a judicial admission, a statement must be "deliberate, clear, and unequivocal" (Rahman v Smith, 40 AD3d 613, 615). The plaintiff's general denials do not meet these criteria.

Gordon also contends that the Supreme Court should not have, in effect, denied that branch of his cross motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment on his cross claims asserted against MERS. To be entitled to such relief, Gordon was required to demonstrate, inter alia, "proof of service" of the cross claims on MERS (CPLR 3215[f]). Although Gordon's counsel affirmed that proof of service of the answer with cross claims upon MERS had been submitted in connection with Gordon's cross motion, the record on appeal does not support this assertion. Since Gordon failed to submit proof of service of process on MERS, he failed to satisfy the requirements for demonstrating his entitlement to leave to enter a default judgment on his cross claims asserted against that defendant (see generally Stevens v Law Off. of Blank & Star, PLLC, 155 AD3d 917, 918).

In light of the foregoing, we modify the order appealed from, insofar as described below. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of Gordon's cross motion which was to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124 appears to have been premised on its granting of that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Gordon, we remit the matter to that court for a new determination of the branch of the defendant's cross motion which was to compel discovery (see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Cutler, 154 AD3d 910, 912).

Accordingly, the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provisions thereof granting those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Dushaun Gordon and dismissing the 20th affirmative defense asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, denying that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dushaun Gordon which was to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124 as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new determination of that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dushaun [*6]Gordon which was to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124.

DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS and DUFFY, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provisions thereof granting those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Dushaun Gordon and dismissing the 20th affirmative defense asserted by that defendant, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, denying that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dushaun Gordon which was to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124 as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new determination of that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dushaun Gordon which was to compel disclosure, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3124.


Clayton: Melvin Gordon’s days with Broncos may be numbered

Melvin Gordon III finally reported to the Denver Broncos on Tuesday after missing the voluntary OTAs.

Naturally, Gordon didn’t want to have the $93,000 fine for missing mandatory minicamp. NFL running backs in their second contract can’t risk it. It’s becoming harder and harder for running backs to make big money in free agency.

Sure, teams took care of Christian McCaffrey, Derrick Henry, Alvin Kamara, Aaron Jones and a few others, but “few” is the key word here. There are only seven backs making $10 million or more. Go back to last year, when Gordon was a free agent. In 2019, he made the mistake of turning down a $10 million contract extension from the Los Angeles Chargers.

Gordon got the most money given to a free agent back in 2020, but it was a two-year, $16 million deal. He’s been to two Pro Bowls. Last year, he did well, getting 986 yards and nine rushing touchdowns. He was 10th in rushing yards. In this year’s free agency period, the best free agent running back deal went to Kenyon Drake, who got a two-year, $11 million deal — only $5.5 million a year.

In his minicamp press conference, he sounded positive but realistic. Despite being the lead running back last year, he knows he’s going to have to battle for the starting job. The Broncos moved up in the second-round to draft Javonte Williams, considered one of the top three backs in the draft. Also competing are Royce Freeman and free agent addition Mike Boone, who signed a two-year, $3.8 million deal.

Taking the positive approach, Gordon said he wants the Broncos to have the best running back group in the NFL. The Broncos wanted bigger, more physical running backs this year. Gordon offers them that, as do the other three. But Gordan is 28, and it’s safe to say he probably will have to find another team after the season.


Because the Girl Scouts was designed for young women, Juliette Gordon Low and other Girl Scout leaders were often asked about their stance on the Suffrage Movement. While Juliette Gordon Low promoted physical activity, leadership training, civic understanding, and career development for her Girl Scouts, she did not openly support the Suffrage Movement. We must carefully read the clues left behind in her writings to find Juliette Gordon Low’s place in the Suffrage Movement.

From the Source



Courtesy of Georgia Historical Society, Gordon Family papers, MS 318. (Images 1-4) Rare Pamphlet Collection. (Image 5)

Excerpt from the letter to Edith C. Macy:

“If it is thoroughly understood by everybody that the Girl Scouts are neutral we will be left out of all practical & religious controversies. _ to leave any one in doubt means in this instance, to arouse the suspicion & perhaps the enmity of 800 suffragettes in Savannah…Neither you nor I nor any representative of Girl Scouts has any option about handling a question on suffrage because we have no right to vote at all.”


Photo, Print, Drawing [Gordon Parks and Xernona Clayton, Atlanta, Georgia]

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