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Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel

Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel

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Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel was born into a wealthy, aristocratic family in Berlin on 2nd January 1886. At the age of eighteen, he joined the Prussian Army and served as a general staff officer in the First World War. (1)

As a member of the Freikorps, Von Stülpnagel was involved in putting down the German Revolution in 1919. As Hans Mommsen, the author of Alternatives to Hitler (2003) pointed out: "For the members of the younger generation of officers, on whom the German revolution of 1918-1920 had left a strong impression, an ingrained anti-communism went without saying." (2)

After the war he served in the German Army reaching the rank of Colonel in 1933. Stülpnagel was a strong opponent of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. "Described by his colleagues as a chvalrous gentleman schooled in philosophy, Von Stülpnagel was opposed from its inception to the Nazi regime, which with many fellow officers he regarded as a stain on the honour of his country." (3)

In January 1938, General Stülpnagel joined forces with Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General Paul von Hase, General-Major Hans Oster, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, Hans Gisevius, Carl Goerdeler, Arthur Nebe, Wolf-Heinrich Helldorf and Hjalmar Schacht, against the Gestapo. They believed that the SS was trying to take control of the German Army and Hase was prepared to use his regiment against the government in Berlin. However, the proposed coup never took place. (4)

In December, 1940, Stülpnagel was given command of the 17th Army. On 22nd June 1941, after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, he successfully led this army across southern Russia on the Eastern Front. Under Stülpnagel's command, the 17th Army achieved victory during the Battle of Uman and the Battle of Kiev. During this period he actively supported the extermination of the Jews and took part in the drawing up the orders for this programme. (5)

In January, 1942, a group of men that included General Stülpnagel, Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, General Friedrich Olbricht, Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, Colonel Albrecht Metz von Quirnheim, General-Major Henning von Tresckow, General-Major Helmuth Stieff, General Erich Fellgiebel, General Paul von Hase, General Lieutenant Karl Freiherr von Thüngen, Lieutenant Fabian Schlabrendorff, Major Hans Ulrich von Oertzen, Wolf-Heinrich Helldorf, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General-Major Hans Oster, and Hans Gisevius, all of Abwehr, Wilhelm Leuschner, Ulrich Hassell, Hans Dohnanyi, Carl Langbehn, Carl Goerdeler, Julius Leber, Helmuth von Moltke, Peter von Wartenburg, Johannes Popitz and Jakob Kaiser, decided to overthrow Adolf Hitler. The conspiracy was called Operation Valkyrie. (6)

In 3rd March, 1942, General Stupnagal was appointed Governor of Paris. In this post he protested against the operations of the agents of Alfred Rosenberg, who sequestered Jewish property without compensation. He also contacted his good friend, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to become involved in the conspiracy. (7) Apparently, Rommel commented: "I know that man. He will neither resign nor kill himself. He will fight, without the least regard for the German people, until there isn't a house left standing in Germany.... I believe it is my duty to come to the rescue of Germany." (8)

During 1942, several senior military officers, joined the conspiracy. This included Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, General Eduard Wagner, General Fritz Lindemann, Lieutenant-Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, Lieutenant Werner von Haeften, Colonel Albrecht Metz von Quirnheim, General-Major Helmuth Stieff, and Colonel-General Erich Hoepner. "These generals, either because of their strength of numbers, their key positions for a revolt, or because of the recognition that the fate of the class was at stake, began to feel an increasing sense of unity." (9)

Eventually, Lieutenant-Colonel Stauffenberg, decided to carry out the assassination himself. But before he took action he wanted to make sure he agreed with the type of government that would come into being. Conservatives such as Carl Goerdeler and Johannes Popitz wanted Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben to become the new Chancellor. However, socialists in the group, such as Julius Leber and Wilhelm Leuschner, argued this would therefore become a military dictatorship. At a meeting on 15th May 1944, they had a strong disagreement over the future of a post-Hitler Germany. (10)

Stauffenberg was highly critical of the conservatives led by Carl Goerdeler and was much closer to the socialist wing of the conspiracy around Julius Leber. Goerdeler later recalled: "Stauffenberg revealed himself as a cranky, obstinate fellow who wanted to play politics. I had many a row with him, but greatly esteemed him. He wanted to steer a dubious political course with the left-wing Socialists and the Communists, and gave me a bad time with his overwhelming egotism." (11)

Peter Hoffmann has argued: "On Goerdeler's insistence he agreed that Goerdeler should be the main negotiator with Leber, Leuschner and their representatives. Goerdeler had already written a letter to Stauffenberg, transmitted through Kaiser, protesting against Stauffenberg negotiating independently with trade union leaders and socialists... This meant that Goerdeler should play the leading role in all non-military questions, as Beck was still insisting as late as July 1944. This he did not so much from suspicion of Stauffenberg as from aversion to exaggerated concentration of power. Moreover Stauffenberg was politically inexperienced; his views were vague; goodwill and idealism by themselves generally only do damage in politics. The fact that he was risking his life did not give Stauffenberg the right to claim power of political decision; Goerdeler and Beck were risking their lives too. The ability to murder Hitler was no adequate justification for assuming the role of political leader." (12)

It was agreed that on the death of Hitler, three speeches were to be broadcast over German radio. Two of the speeches were to be directed to the armed forces and were to be delivered by Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben and General Ludwig Beck. The other was addressed to the German people and would be given by the conservative politician, Carl Goerdeler, who would come out of hiding once the coup had been confirmed. General Erich Fellgiebel, Chief of Signals of the OKW, would cut down all communications from Hitler's headquarters following the assassination and General Stülpnagel, would arrange for the troops under his command in France to arrest all Gestapo and SS officers. (13)

Stauffenberg attended his first meeting with Hitler on 6th July. He had a bomb with him but for reasons that to this day are not entirely clear, he did not try to kill Hitler. The generally accepted theory is that Stauffenberg was dissuaded from acting because neither Heinrich Himmler or Hermann Göring were present. Several conspirators, including General Ludwig Beck, wanted these two men killed at the same time as Hitler. The theory being that Göring and Himmler would take power after the death of Hitler. (14)

On 11th July, Stauffenberg flew once more to Hitler's headquarters in Berchtesgaden. He had a bomb with him but did not set it off because Himmler and Göring were not at the meeting. According to Peter Hoffmann: "There was never any certainty that Himmler or Göring would be present at the briefing conferences; neither of them attended regularly. They were usually represented by their liaison officers who reported to them; they themselves came comparatively seldom. Sometimes Himmler and Göring had no personal contact with Hitler for weeks; at other times one of the other would attend several conferences with Hitler daily." (15) Stauffenberg remained committed to trying to kill Hitler although he had little confidence he would be successful. On 14th July he was quoted as saying: "The worst thing is knowing that we cannot succeed and yet that we have to do it, for our country and our children." (16)

Claus von Stauffenberg had another meeting with Adolf Hitler on 15th July. Although he had the bomb with him he did not take this opportunity to kill Hitler. The main reason was probably the difficulty he would have had in fusing his bomb. Since he only had three fingers on one hand he had to use a pair of pliers and this would certainly have been seen. It has been claimed that if he had bent down "to his briefcase and began to open it with his three fingers - someone would certainly have come to his assistance, lifted it on to the table and helped him take out the papers - impossible then to search round for the pliers, squeeze the fuse and put the briefcase back on the floor." (17)

Stauffenberg needed help in his task and his adjutant, Werner von Haeften, agreed to help assassinate Hitler, when he told his brother, the diplomat, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, also a member of the conspiracy, he raised objections on religious grounds. For sometime he had become entangled in a web of philosophical and religious reflection. He asked Werner: "Are you absolutely sure this is your duty before God and our forefathers?" Werner replied that the act was justified because it would bring an end to the war and would therefore save the lives of many Germans. (18)

Claus von Stauffenberg was now convinced that he was morally justified in taking this action. His religious and ethical beliefs led him to the conclusion that it was his duty to eliminate Hitler and his murderous regime by any means possible. Just before he left on his mission to kill Hitler he said: "It is now time that something was done. But he who has the courage to do something must do so in the knowledge that he will go down in German history as a traitor. If he does not do it, however, he will be a traitor to his conscience." (19)

Other members of the conspiracy also urged action. Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, who had been an integral part of the resistance from the beginning, continued to argue that the attempt must be made, regardless of the consequences. As Theodore S. Hamerow pointed out: "Some of those involved in planning the coup started to suggest that the attempt to overthrow the Nazi regime must be made not primarily to save Germany but as an act of atonement or expiation. Even if it should fail, even if the fatherland should be conquered and occupied, the resistance must wage its struggle against National Socialism as a moral obligation, as a sacrifice for mankind, as an appeal for forgiveness and redemption... What mattered was proving to the world that at least some Germans, acting out of conscience and in accordance with universal moral values, were willing to sacrifice themselves to protect humanity against an unspeakable evil." (20)

On 20th July, 1944, Stauffenberg and Haeften left Berlin to meet with Hitler at the Wolf' Lair. After a two-hour flight from Berlin, they landed at Rastenburg at 10.15. Stauffenberg had a briefing with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Armed Forces High Commandat, at 11.30, with the meeting with Hitler due to take place at 12.30. As soon as the meeting was over, Stauffenberg, met up with Haeften, who was carrying the two bombs in his briefcase. They then went into the toilet to set the time-fuses in the bombs. They only had time to prepare one bomb when they were interrupted by a junior officer who told them that the meeting with Hitler was about to start. Stauffenberg then made the fatal decision to place one of the bombs in his briefcase. "Had the second device, even without the charge being set, been placed in Stauffenberg's bag alone with the first, it would have been detonated by the explosion, more than doubling the effect. Almost certainly, in such an event, no one would have survived." (21)

When he entered the wooden briefing hut, twenty-four senior officers were in assembled around a huge map table on two heavy oak supports. Stauffenberg had to elbow his way forward a little in order to get near enough to the table and he had to place the briefcase so that it was in no one's way. Despite all his efforts, however, he could only get to the right-hand corner of the table. After a few minutes, Stauffenberg excused himself, saying that he had to take a telephone call from Berlin. There was continual coming and going during the briefing conferences and this did not raise any suspicions. (22)

Stauffenberg and Haeften went straight to a building about 200 hundred yards away consisting of bunkers and reinforced huts. Shortly afterwards, according to eyewitnesses: "A deafening crack shattered the midday quiet, and a bluish-yellow flame rocketed skyward... and a dark plume of smoke rose and hung in the air over the wreckage of the briefing barracks. Shards of glass, wood, and fiberboard swirled about, and scorched pieces of paper and insulation rained down." (23)

Stauffenberg and Haeften observed a body covered with Hitler's cloak being carried out of the briefing hut on a stretcher and assumed he had been killed. They got into a car but luckily the alarm had not yet been given when they reached Guard Post 1. The Lieutenant in charge, who had heard the blast, stopped the car and asked to see their papers. Stauffenberg who was given immediate respect with his mutilations suffered on the front-line and his aristocratic commanding exterior; said he must go to the airfield at once. After a short pause the Lieutenant let them go. (24)

According to eyewitness testimony and a subsequent investigation by the Gestapo, Stauffenberg's briefcase containing the bomb had been moved farther under the conference table in the last seconds before the explosion in order to provide additional room for the participants around the table. Consequently, the table acted as a partial shield, protecting Hitler from the full force of the blast, sparing him from serious injury of death. The stenographer Heinz Berger, died that afternoon, and three others, General Rudolf Schmundt, General Günther Korten, and Colonel Heinz Brandt did not recover from their wounds. Hitler's right arm was badly injured but he survived. (25)

However, General Erich Fellgiebel, Chief of Army Communications, sent a message to General Friedrich Olbricht to say that Hitler had survived the blast. The most calamitous flaw in Operation Valkyrie was the failure to consider the possibility that Hitler might survive the bomb attack. Olbricht told Hans Gisevius, they decided it was best to wait and to do nothing, to behave "routinely" and to follow their everyday habits. (26) Major Albrecht Metz von Quirnheim long closely involved in the plot, had already begun the action with a cabled message to regional military commanders, beginning with the words: "The Führer, Adolf Hitler, is dead." (27)

On hearing this General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel arrested as planned 1,200 SS and Gestapo men in Paris and cut off all communication from France to Germany. (28) The original plan was for Ludwig Beck, Erwin von Witzleben and Erich Fromm to take control of the German Army and Wolf-Heinrich Helldorf, promised to use his role as Chief of the Berlin Police, to help the conspirators to gain power. According to Hans Gisevius, at a meeting soon after the assassination attempt, General Friedrich Olbricht "informed Helldorf in the tone of a military command that the Führer had been the victim of assassination that afternoon" and "the Wehrmacht had taken over the direction of the government; a state of siege was being proclaimed." (29)

Stauffenberg arrived back in Berlin and went straight to see General Friedrich Fromm. Stauffenberg insisted that Hitler was dead. Fromm replied that he had just learnt from Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel that Hitler had survived the bomb attack. Stauffenberg replied, "Field Marshal Keitel is lying as usual. I myself saw Hitler being carried out dead." He then admitted that he had planted the bomb himself. Fromm became very angry and declared that all the conspirators were under arrest, whereupon Stauffenberg retorted that, on the contrary, they were in control and he was under arrest. (30)

Colonel-General Ludwig Beck telephoned Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, the Supreme Commander West in occupied France. Beck told him Hitler was dead: "Kluge, I now ask you clearly: Do you approve of this action of ours and do you place yourself under my orders?" Kluge hesitated and Beck added: "Kluge, in order to remove the slightest doubt, I want to remind you of our last conversations and agreements. I ask again: Do you place yourself unconditionally under my orders?" Kluge replied that he would have to confer with his staff and would call back in half an hour. The conspirators were now convinced that Kluge would not support the coup. (31)

Shortly after the assassination attempt, Joseph Goebbels broadcast a communiqué over German radio, assuring the public that Hitler was alive and well and that he would speak to the nation later that evening. Goebbels began the broadcast with the following words: "Today an attempt was made on the Führer's life with explosives... The Führer himself suffered no injuries beyond light burns and bruises. He resumed his work immediately." (32)

Albert Speer, minister of armaments, visited Goebbels soon after the broadcast. He described the scene outside: "The office windows looked out on the street. A few minutes after my arrival I saw fully equipped soldiers, in steel helmets, hand grenades at their belts and submachine guns in their hands, moving toward the Blandenburg Gate in small, battle ready groups. They set up machine guns at the gate and stopped all traffic. Meanwhile, two heavily armed men went up to the door along the park and stood guard there." However, Goebbels was not confident that he would not be arrested and carried with him some potassium cyanide capsules. (33)

Goebbels was safe because the July 1944 Plot had been so badly organized. No real attempt had been made to arrest the Nazi leaders or to kill them. Nor did they secure immediate control of the radio and telephone communications systems. This was surprising as weeks earlier the original plan included the seizure of the long-distance telephone office, the main telegraph office, the radio broadcasting facilities in and around Berlin, and the central post office. "Incomprehensibly, the conspirators did not carry out these actions with sufficient dispatch, and this produced utter and fatal confusion." (34)

Later that day, Goebbels told Heinrich Himmler: "If they hadn't been so clumsy! They had an enormous chance. What dolts! What childishness? When I think how I would have handled such a thing. Why didn't they occupy the radio station and spread the wildest lies? Here they put guards in front of my door. But they let me go right ahead and telephone the Führer, mobilize everything! They didn't even silence my telephone. To hold so many trumps and botch it - what beginners!" (35)

Sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., the cordon that the conspirators had established around the government quarter was lifted. Military units that initially had supported the conspirators were switching loyalties back to the Nazis. The main reason for this was the series of radio announcements that were broadcast throughout Germany. By 10.00 p.m., forces loyal to the government were able to seize control of central headquarters and General Friedrich Fromm was released and Claus von Stauffenberg and his followers were taken prisoner. (36)

Those arrested included Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, General Friedrich Olbricht, Colonel Albrecht Metz von Quirnheim and Lieutenant Werner von Haeften. Fromm decided that he would hold an immediate court-martial. Stauffenberg spoke out, claiming in a few clipped sentences sole responsibility for everything and stating that the others had acted purely as soldiers and his subordinates. (37) It is claimed that Olbricht stated: "I know with certainty that all of us acted free of any sort of personal motives, and that we dared attempt the ultimate only in a situation that was already desperate, in order to protect Germany against total destruction." (38)

All the conspirators were found guilty and sentenced to death. Hoepner, an old friend, was spared to stand further trial. Beck requested the right to commit suicide. According to the testimony of Hoepner, Beck was given back his own pistol and he shot himself in the temple, but only managed to give himself a slight head wound. "In a state of extreme stress, Beck asked for another gun, and an attendant staff officer offered him a Mauser. But the second shot also failed to kill him, and a sergeant then gave Beck the coup de grâce. He was given Beck's leather overcoat as a reward." (39)

The condemned men were taken to the courtyard. Drivers of vehicles parked in the courtyard were instructed to position them so that their headlight would illuminate the scene. General Olbricht was shot first and then it was Stauffenberg's turn. He shouted "Long live holy Germany." The salvo rang out but Haeften had thrown himself in front of Stauffenberg and was shot first. Only the next salvo killed Stauffenberg and was shot first. Only the next salvo killed Stauffenberg. Quirnheim was the last man shot. It was 12.30 a.m. (40)

Adolf Hitler, seized by a "titanic fury and an Unquenchable thirst for revenge" ordered Heinrich Himmler and Ernst Kaltenbrunner to arrest "every last person who had dared to plot against him". Hitler laid down the procedure for killing them: "This time the criminals will be given short shrift. No military tribunals. We'll hail them before the People's Court. No long speeches from them. The court will act with lightning speed. And two hours after the sentence it will be carried out. By hanging - without mercy." (41)

It is estimated that 4,980 people were arrested by the Gestapo. Himmler gave instructions that these men should be tortured. He also ordered that family members should also be punished: "When they (the people's Germanic forbears) put a family under the ban and declared it outlawed or when there was a vendetta in the family, they were totally consistent about it. If the family was outlawed or banned; it will be exterminated. And in a vendetta they exterminated the entire clan down to its last member. The Stauffenberg family will be exterminated down to its last member." (42) What became known as the "kith and kin" law, was a particularly sophisticated form of torture. When interrogating suspects the Gestapo could, quite legally, threaten to ill-treat their wives, children, parents, brothers and sisters or other relatives. (43)

On hearing that the coup had failed, General Stülpnagel was forced to release his 1,200 SS and Gestapo men in Paris. He was now recalled to Berlin by Hitler. On the way through France by car, he stopped where, during the First World War, he was fought in the Battle of Verdun and told his guard and driver that he wanted to look at the battlefield. Soon after he left the car and shot himself in the head. In attempting suicide he had blinded himself in one eye and so badly damaged the other that it had to be removed in the local military hospital. He was operated on that night and, though his life was saved, he was blind. (44)

General Stülpnagel was now returned to Berlin where he was taken to the Gestapo cells in Prinz Albrecht Strasse where he was tortured until he confessed that Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had told him, "Tell the people in Berlin they can count on me." Despite his terrible injuries he was taken to the People's Court on a stretcher where he was tried by Roland Freisler. Stülpnagel was found guilty and was executed at Ploetzwnsee Prison on 30th August, 1944. (45)

At the centre of the plot were such senior officers as Major General Henning von Tresckow, chief of staff in Army Group Center on the Russian front; Colonel General Erich Hoepner, the commander of an armoured force who had been dismissed by Hitler in December 1941; Colonel Friedrich Olbricht, head of the Supply Section of the Reserve Army; Colonel General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, military governor of France; Major General Hans Oster, chief of staff of Abwehr; and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, who has been retired from active service in 1942. Added to these senior members were a number of younger officers who believed that the Third Reich was a catastrophe for Germany and were willing to gamble their lives on the outcome of the plot.

General von Stülpnagel, whose prompt actions in Paris had resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of all the Gestapo and SS officers there, was recalled to Berlin by Hitler. On the way through France by car, he stopped where, during the First World War, he had fought in the Battle of Verdun and told his guard and driver that he wanted to look at the battlefield. Soon after he left the car they heard a gunshot and found von Stülpnagel in a nearby canal. In attempting suicide he had blinded himself in one eye and so badly damaged the other that it had to be removed in the military hospital in Verdun. While he was semi-conscious following his operation, von Stülpnagel was rambling and one of the names he mentioned was that of Erwin Rommel. It alerted the Nazis to the possibility that Germany's most popular general might have been involved in the attempt on Hitler's life.

(1) James Taylor and Warren Shaw, Dictionary of the Third Reich (1987) page 281

(2) Hans Mommsen, Alternatives to Hitler (2003) page 247

(3) Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (1998) page 339

(4) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 44

(5) Hans Mommsen, Alternatives to Hitler (2003) page 249

(6) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 270

(7) Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (1998) page 339

(8) Susan Ottaway, Hitler's Traitors, German Resistance to the Nazis (2003) page 155

(9) Hans Gisevius, Valkyrie: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler (2009) page 108

(10) Elfriede Nebgen, Jakob Kaiser (1967) page 184

(11) Roger Manvell, The July Plot: The Attempt in 1944 on Hitler's Life and the Men Behind It (1964) page 77

(12) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 318

(13) Susan Ottaway, Hitler's Traitors, German Resistance to the Nazis (2003) page 156

(14) Louis R. Eltscher, Traitors or Patriots: A Story of the German Anti-Nazi Resistance (2014) page 311

(15) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 381

(16) Louis R. Eltscher, Traitors or Patriots: A Story of the German Anti-Nazi Resistance (2014) page 298

(17) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) pages 382-383

(18) Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler's Death (1997) page 240

(19) Louis R. Eltscher, Traitors or Patriots: A Story of the German Anti-Nazi Resistance (2014) page 298

(20) Theodore S. Hamerow, On the Road to the Wolf's Lair - German Resistance to Hitler (1997) page 349

(21) Ian Kershaw, Luck of the Devil: The Story of Operation Valkyrie (2009) page 39

(22) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 400

(23) Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler's Death (1997) page 258

(24) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 401

(25) Louis R. Eltscher, Traitors or Patriots: A Story of the German Anti-Nazi Resistance (2014) page 313

(26) Hans Gisevius, interviewed by Peter Hoffmann (8th September, 1972)

(27) Ian Kershaw, Luck of the Devil: The Story of Operation Valkyrie (2009) page 46

(28) James Taylor and Warren Shaw, Dictionary of the Third Reich (1987) page 281

(29) Hans Gisevius, Valkyrie: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler (2009) page 173

(30) Anton Gill, An Honourable Defeat: A History of German Resistance to Hitler (1994) pages 247-248

(31) Hans Gisevius, Valkyrie: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler (2009) page 193

(32) Michael C. Thomsett, The German Opposition to Hitler: The Resistance, the Underground, and Assassination Plots (1997) page 218

(33) Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (1970) page 383

(34) Louis R. Eltscher, Traitors or Patriots: A Story of the German Anti-Nazi Resistance (2014) page 320

(35) Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (1970) page 388

(36) Nigel Jones, Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler (2008) page 254

(37) Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler's Death (1997) page 278

(38) General Friedrich Olbricht, comment just before his execution (20th July, 1944)

(39) Susan Ottaway, Hitler's Traitors, German Resistance to the Nazis (2003) page 250

(40) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 508

(41) William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1964) page 1272

(42) Heinrich Himmler, speech (3rd August 1944)

(43) Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance (1977) page 520

(44) Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler's Death (1997) page 282

(45) Susan Ottaway, Hitler's Traitors, German Resistance to the Nazis (2003) page 165


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